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Abstract
According to economic theory—supported by empirical and laboratory evidence—the equilibrium
price of a ﬁnancial security reﬂects all of the information regarding the security’s value.We investigate
the computational process on the path toward equilibrium, where information distributed among
traders is revealed step-by-step over time and incorporated into the market price. We develop a
simpliﬁed model of an information market, along with trading strategies, in order to formalize the
computational properties of the process. We show that securities whose payoffs cannot be expressed
as weighted threshold functions of distributed input bits are not guaranteed to converge to the proper
equilibrium predicted by economic theory. On the other hand, securities whose payoffs are threshold
functions are guaranteed to converge, for all prior probability distributions. Moreover, these threshold
securities converge in at most n rounds, where n is the number of bits of distributed information.
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We also prove a lower bound, showing a type of threshold security that requires at least n/2 rounds
to converge in the worst case.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The strong form of the efﬁcient markets hypothesis states that market prices nearly in-
stantly incorporate all information available to all traders. As a result, market prices encode
the best forecasts of future outcomes given all information, even if that information is
distributed across many sources. Supporting evidence can be found in empirical studies
of options markets [15], political stock markets [8,9,23], sports betting markets [3,10,28],
horse-racing markets [31], market games [24,25], and laboratory investigations of experi-
mental markets [7,26,27].
The process of information incorporation is, at its essence, a distributed computation.
Each trader begins with his or her own information. As trades are made, summary infor-
mation is revealed through market prices. Traders learn or infer what information others
are likely to have by observing prices, then update their own beliefs based on their obser-
vations. Over time, if the process works as advertised, all information is revealed, and all
traders converge to the same information state. At this point, the market is in what is called a
rational expectations equilibrium [12,17,20]. All information available to all traders is now
reﬂected in the going prices, and no further trades are desirable until some new information
becomes available.
While most markets are not designed with information aggregation as a primary
motivation—for example, derivatives markets are intended mainly for risk management
and sports betting markets for entertainment—recently, some markets have been created
solely for the purpose of aggregating information on a topic of interest. The Iowa Electronic
Market 4 is a prime example, operated by the University of Iowa Tippie College of Business
for the purpose of investigating how information about political elections distributed among
traders gets reﬂected in securities prices whose payoffs are tied to actual election outcomes
[8,9].
In this paper, we investigate the nature of the computational process whereby distributed
information is revealed and combined over time into the prices in information markets.
To do so, in Section 3, we propose a model of an information market that is tractable
for theoretical analysis and, we believe, captures much of the important essence of real
information markets. In Section 4, we present our main theoretical results concerning this
model. We prove that only Boolean securities whose payoffs can be expressed as threshold
functions of the distributed input bits of information are guaranteed to converge as predicted
by rational expectations theory. Boolean securities with more complex payoffs may not
converge under some prior distributions. We also provide upper and lower bounds on the
4 http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/
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convergence time for these threshold securities. We show that, for all prior distributions,
the price of a threshold security converges to its rational expectations equilibrium price in
at most n rounds, where n is the number of bits of distributed information. We show that
this worst-case bound is tight within a factor of two by illustrating a situation in which a
threshold security requires n/2 rounds to converge.
2. Relationship to related work
As mentioned, there is a great deal of documented evidence supporting the notion that
markets are able to aggregate information in a number of scenarios using a variety of market
mechanisms. The theoretically ideal mechanism requires what is called a complete market.
A complete market contains enough linearly independent securities to span the entire state
space of interest [1,32]. That is, the dimensionality of the available securities equals the
dimensionality of the event space over which information is to be aggregated. 5 In this
ideal case, all private information becomes common knowledge in equilibrium, and thus
any function of the private information can be directly evaluated by any agent or observer.
However, this theoretical ideal is almost never achievable in practice, because it generally
requires a number of securities exponential in the number of random variables of interest.
When available securities form an incomplete market [18] in relation to the desired
information space—as is usually the case—aggregation may be partial. Not all private
information is revealed in equilibrium, and prices may not convey enough information
to recover the complete joint probability distribution over all events. Still, it is generally
assumed that aggregation does occur along the dimensions represented in the market; that
is, prices do reﬂect a consistent projection of the entire joint distribution onto the smaller-
dimensional space spanned by securities. In this paper, we investigate cases in which even
this partial aggregation fails. For example, even though there is enoughprivate information to
determine completely the price of a security in the market, the equilibrium price may in fact
reveal no information at all! So characterizations ofwhen a rational expectations equilibrium
is fully revealing do not immediately apply to our problem. We are not asking whether all
possible functions of private information can be evaluated, but whether a particular target
function can be evaluated. We show that properties of the function itself play a major role,
not just the relative dimensionalities of the information and security spaces.
Our second main contribution is examining the dynamics of information aggregation
before equilibrium, in particular proving upper and lower bounds on the time to convergence
in those cases in which aggregation succeeds.
Shoham and Tennenholtz [30] deﬁne a rationally computable function as a function
of agents’ valuations (types) that can be computed by a market, assuming agents follow
rational equilibrium strategies. The authors mainly consider auctions of goods as their basic
mechanistic unit and examine the communication complexity involved in computing various
functions of agents’ valuations of goods. For example, they give auction mechanisms that
can compute the maximum, minimum, and kth-highest of the agents’ valuations of a single
5 When we refer to independence or dimensionality of securities, we mean the independence or dimensionality
of the random variables on which the security payoffs are based.
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good using 1, 1, and n− k+ 1 bits of communication, respectively. They also examine the
potential tradeoff between communication complexity and revenue.
3. Model of an information market
To investigate the properties and limitations of the processwhereby an informationmarket
converges toward its rational-expectations equilibrium,we formulate a representativemodel
of the market. In designing the model, our goals were two-fold: (1) to make the model rich
enough to be realistic and (2) to make the model simple enough to admit meaningful
analysis. Any modeling decisions must trade off these two generally conﬂicting goals,
and the decision process is as much an art as a science. Nonetheless, we believe that our
model captures enough of the essence of real information markets to lend credence to the
results that follow. In this section, we present our modeling assumptions and justiﬁcations
in detail. Section 3.1 describes the initial information state of the system, Section 3.2 covers
the market mechanism, and Section 3.3 presents the agents’ strategies.
3.1. Initial information state
There are n agents (traders) in the system, each of whom is privy to one bit of information,
denoted xi . The vector of all n bits is denoted x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). In the initial state, each
agent is aware only of her own bit of information. All agents have a common prior regarding
the joint distribution of bits among agents, but none has any speciﬁc information about the
actual value of bits held by others. Note that this common-prior assumption—typical in
the economics literature—does not imply that all agents agree. To the contrary, because
each agent has different information, the initial state of the system is in general a state of
disagreement.
Example 1. Suppose there are two agents, each with a single bit of information. Then, the
information vector is x = (x1, x2). Further, if the prior probability distribution is uniform,
then each of the four possible values for x will have a prior probability of 14 . Now, agent
1 observes x1; say she observes x1 = 0. Then, conditioned on this information, agent 1
believes P((x1, x2) = (0, 0)) = P((x1, x2) = (0, 1)) = 12 . Similarly, if agent 2 observes
x2 = 1, he will condition on this information to get posterior probabilities P((x1, x2) =
(0, 1)) = P((x1, x2) = (1, 1)) = 12 . Thus, the agents share a common prior but have
different posterior beliefs because of their different information. Also, neither agent knows
the exact value of (x1, x2), despite the fact that their combined information is sufﬁcient to
determine it.
3.2. Market mechanism
The security being traded by the agents is a ﬁnancial instrument whose payoff is a
function f (x) of the agents’ bits. The form of f (the description of the security) is common
knowledge 6 among agents. We sometimes refer to the xi as the input bits. At some time in
6
“Common knowledge” is information that all agents know, that all agents know that all agents know, and so
on ad inﬁnitum [5].
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the future after trading is completed, the true value of f (x) is revealed, 7 and every owner of
the security is paid an amount f (x) in cash per unit owned. If an agent ends with a negative
quantity of the security (by selling short), then the agent must pay the amount f (x) in cash
per unit. Note that if someone were to have complete knowledge of all input bits x, then
that person would know the true value f (x) of the security with certainty, and so would
be willing to buy it at any price lower than f (x) and (short) sell it at any price higher than
f (x). 8
Following Dubey et al. [4], and Jackson and Peck [14], we model the market-price
formation process as a multiperiod Shapley–Shubik market game [29]. The Shapley–Shubik
process operates as follows: The market proceeds in synchronous rounds. In each round,
each agent i submits a bid bi and a quantity qi . The semantics are that agent i is supplying
a quantity qi of the security and an amount bi of money to be traded in the market. For
simplicity, we assume that there are no restrictions on credit or short sales, and so an agent’s
trade is not constrained by her possessions. The market clears in each round by settling at
a single price that balances the trade in that round: the clearing price is p =∑i bi/∑i qi .
At the end of the round, agent i holds a quantity q ′i proportional to the money she bid:
q ′i = bi/p. In addition, she is left with an amount of money b′i that reﬂects her net trade
at price p: b′i = bi − p(q ′i − qi) = pqi . Note that agent i’s net trade in the security is a
purchase if p < bi/qi and a sale if p > bi/qi .
After each round, the clearing pricep is publicly revealed. Agents then revise their beliefs
according to any information garnered from the new price. The next round proceeds as the
previous. The process continues until an equilibrium is reached, meaning that prices and
bids do not change from one round to the next.
In this paper, we make a further simplifying restriction on the trading in each round: we
assume that qi = 1 for each agent i. This modeling assumption serves two analytical pur-
poses. First, it ensures that there is forced trade in every round. Classic results in economics
show that perfectly rational and risk-neutral agents will never trade with each other for
purely speculative reasons (even if they have differing information) [21]. There are many
factors that can induce rational agents to trade, such as differing degrees of risk aversion, the
presence of other traders who are trading for liquidity reasons rather than speculative gain,
or a market maker who is pumping money into the market through a subsidy. We sidestep
this issue by simply assuming that the informed agents will trade (for unspeciﬁed reasons).
Second, forcing qi = 1 for all i means that the total volume of trade and the impact of any
one trader on the clearing price are common knowledge; the clearing price p is a simple
function of the agents’ bids, p =∑i bi/n. We will discuss the implications of alternative
market models in Section 5.
3.3. Agent strategies
In order to draw formal conclusions about the price evolution process, we need to
make some assumptions about how agents behave. Essentially we assume that agents are
7 The values of the input bits themselves may or may not be publicly revealed.
8 Throughout this paper we ignore the time value of money.
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risk-neutral, myopic, 9 and bid truthfully: each agent in each round bids his or her current
valuation of the security, which is that agent’s estimation of the expected payoff of the secu-
rity. Expectations are computed according to each agent’s probability distribution, which is
updated via Bayes’ rule. When new information (revealed via the clearing prices) becomes
available. We also assume that it is common knowledge that all the agents behave in the
speciﬁed manner.
Example 2. Consider the initial information setup in Example 1, and introduce a security
F based on the OR function f (x) = x1 ∨ x2, that is F eventually pays off $1 if f (x) is
1. Suppose agent 1 observed x1 = 0 and agent 2 observed x2 = 1. Then agent 1’s initial
expectation of the value of F is 0.5; hence, in our model, she would bid b1 = 0.5 in the
ﬁrst round of trading. On the other hand, agent 2 would know for certain that f is 1, and
would bid b2 = 1. The clearing price of the market after the ﬁrst round would thus be 0.75.
Would rational agents actually behave according to this strategy? It is hard to say. Cer-
tainly, we do not claim that this is an equilibrium strategy in the game-theoretic sense.
Furthermore, it is clear that we are ignoring some legitimate tactics, for example, bidding
falsely in one round in order to effect other agents’ judgments in the following rounds (non-
myopic reasoning). However, we believe that the strategy outlined is a reasonable starting
point for analysis. Solving for a true game-theoretic equilibrium strategy in this setting
seems extremely difﬁcult. Our assumptions seem reasonable when there are enough agents
in the system such that extremely complex meta-reasoning is not likely to improve upon
simply bidding one’s true expected value. In this case, according the the Shapley–Shubik
mechanism, if the clearing price is below an agent’s expected value that agent will end up
buying (increasing expected proﬁt); otherwise, if the clearing price is above the agent’s
expected value, the agent will end up selling (also increasing expected proﬁt).
4. Computational properties
In this section, we study the computational power of information markets for a class of
aggregation functions: Boolean functions of n variables. We characterize the set of Boolean
functions that can be computed in our market model for all prior distributions and then
prove upper and lower bounds on the worst-case convergence time for these markets.
The information structurewe assume is as follows: there are n agents, and each agent i has
a single bit of private information xi . All the agents also have a common prior probability
distribution P : {0, 1}n → [0, 1] over the values of x. We deﬁne a Boolean aggregate
function f (x) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that we would like the market to compute. Note that x,
and hence f (x), is completely determined by the combination of all the agents’ information,
but it is not known to any one agent. The agents trade in a Boolean security F , which pays
off $1 if f (x) = 1 and $0 if f (x) = 0. So an omniscient agent with access to all the agents’
9 Risk neutrality implies that each agent’s utility for the security is linearly related to his or her subjective
estimation of the expected payoff of the security. Myopic behavior means that agents treat each round as if it were
the ﬁnal round: they do not reason about how their bids may affect the bids of other agents in future rounds.
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bits would know the true value of security F—either exactly $1 or exactly $0. In reality,
risk-neutral agents with limited information will value F according to their expectation of
its payoff, or Ei[f (x)], where Ei is the expectation operator applied according to agent i’s
probability distribution.
For any function f , trading in F may happen to converge to the true value of f (x) by
coincidence if the prior probability distribution is sufﬁciently degenerate.More interestingly,
wewould like to know forwhich functionsf does the price of the securityF always converge
to f (x) for all prior probability distributions P . 10 In Section 4.2, we prove a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition that guarantees convergence. In Section 4.3, we address the natural
follow-up question, by deriving upper and lower bounds on theworst-case number of rounds
of trading required for the value of f (x) to be revealed.
4.1. Equilibrium price characterization
Our analysis builds on a characterization of the equilibrium price of F that follows from
a powerful result on common knowledge of aggregates due to McKelvey and Page [20],
later extended by Nielsen et al. [22].
Information markets aim to aggregate the knowledge of all the agents. Procedurally,
this occurs because the agents learn from the markets: the price of the security conveys
information to each agent about the knowledge of other agents. We can model the ﬂow of
information through prices as follows.
Let = {0, 1}n be the set of possible values of x; we say that denotes the set of possible
“states of the world.” The prior P deﬁnes everyone’s initial belief about the likelihood of
each state. As trading proceeds, some possible states can be logically ruled out, but the
relative likelihoods among the remaining states are fully determined by the prior P . So
the common knowledge after any stage is completely described by the set of states that an
external observer—with no information beyond the sequence of prices observed—considers
possible (along with the prior). Similarly, the knowledge of agent i at any point is also
completely described by the set of states she considers possible. We use the notation Sr
to denote the common-knowledge possibility set after round r , and Sri to denote the set of
states that agent i considers possible after round r .
Initially, the only common knowledge is that the input vector x is in , where  is the
set of states assigned a non-zero probability by the prior, generically all possible states. In
other words, the set of states considered possible by an external observer before trading has
occurred is the set S0 = . However, each agent i also knows the value of her bit xi ; thus,
her knowledge set S0i is the set {y ∈ |yi = xi}. Agent i’s ﬁrst-round bid is her conditional
expectation of the event f (x) = 1 given that x ∈ S0i . All the agents’ bids are processed,
and the clearing price p1 is announced. An external observer could predict agent i’s bid if
he knew the value of xi . Thus, if he knew the value of x, he could predict the value of p1. In
other words, the external observer knows the function price1(x) that relates the ﬁrst round
price to the true state x. Of course, he does not know the value of x; however, he can rule
10 We assume that the common prior is consistent with x in the sense that it assigns a non-zero probability to the
actual value of x.
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out any vector x that would have resulted in a different clearing price from the observed
price p1.
Thus, the common knowledge after round 1 is the set S1 = {y ∈ S0| price1(y) = p1}.
Agent i knows the common knowledge and, in addition, knows the value of bit xi . Hence,
after every round r , the knowledge of agent i is given by Sri = {y ∈ Sr |yi = xi}. Note
that, because knowledge can only improve over time, we must always have Sri ⊆ Sr−1i and
Sr ⊆ Sr−1. Thus, only a ﬁnite number of changes in each agent’s knowledge are possible,
and so eventually we must converge to an equilibrium after which no player learns any
further information. We use S∞ to denote the common knowledge at this point, and S∞i to
denote agent i’s knowledge at this point. Let p∞ denote the clearing price at equilibrium.
Informally, McKelvey and Page [20] show that, if n people with common priors but dif-
ferent information about the likelihood of some event A agree about a “suitable” aggregate
of their individual conditional probabilities, then their individual conditional probabilities
of event A’s occurring must be identical. (The precise deﬁnition of “suitable” is described
below.) There is a strong connection to rational expectation equilibria in markets, which
was noted in the original McKelvey–Page paper: the market price of a security is common
knowledge at the point of equilibrium. Thus, if the price is a “suitable” aggregate of the
conditional expectations of all the agents, then in equilibrium they must have identical con-
ditional expectations of the event that the security will pay off. (Note that their information
may still be different.)
Deﬁnition 1 (Bergin and Brandenburger [2]). A function g : n →  is called stochas-
tically monotone if it can be written in the form g(x) = ∑i gi(xi), where each function
gi :  →  is strictly increasing.
Bergin and Brandenburger [2] proved that this simple deﬁnition of stochastically mono-
tone functions is equivalent to the original deﬁnition in McKelvey–Page [20].
Deﬁnition 2 (McKelvey and Page [20]). A function g : n →  is called stochastically
regular if it can be written in the form g = h ◦ g′, where g′ is stochastically monotone and
h is invertible on the range of g′.
We can now state the McKelvey–Page result, as generalized by Nielsen et al. [22]. In
our context, the following simple theorem statement sufﬁces; more general versions of this
theorem can be found in [20,22].
Theorem 3 (Nielsen et al. [22]). Suppose that, at equilibrium, the n agents have a com-
mon prior, but possibly different information, about the value of a random variable F , as
described above. For all i, let p∞i = E(F |x ∈ S∞i ). If g is a stochastically regular function
and g(p∞1 , p∞2 , . . . , p∞n ) is common knowledge, then it must be the case that
p∞1 = p∞2 = · · · = p∞n = E(F |x ∈ S∞) = p∞.
In one round of our simpliﬁed Shapley–Shubik trading model, the announced price is the
mean of the conditional expectations of the n agents. The mean is a stochastically regular
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function; hence, Theorem 3 shows that, at equilibrium, all agents have identical conditional
expectations of the payoff of the security. It follows that the equilibrium price p∞ must be
exactly the conditional expectations of all agents at equilibrium.
Theorem 3 does not in itself say how the equilibrium is reached. McKelvey and Page,
extending an argument due to Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [11], show that repeated an-
nouncement of the aggregate will eventually result in common knowledge of the aggregate.
In our context, this is achieved by announcing the current price at the end of each round;
this will ultimately converge to a state in which all agents bid the same price p∞.
However, reaching an equilibrium price is not sufﬁcient for the purposes of information
aggregation. We also want the price to reveal the actual value of f (x). It is possible that the
equilibrium price p∞ of the security F will not be either 0 or 1, and so we cannot infer the
value of f (x) from it.
Example 3. Consider two agents 1 and 2with private input bits x1 and x2 respectively. Sup-
pose the prior probability distribution is uniform, i.e., x = (x1, x2) takes the values (0, 0),
(0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1) each with probability 14 . Now, suppose the aggregate function we
want to compute is the XOR function, f (x) = x1 ⊕ x2. To this end, we design a market to
trade in a Boolean security F , which will eventually payoff $1 iff x1 ⊕ x2 = 1.
If agent 1 observes x1 = 1, she estimates the expected value of F to be the probability
that x2 = 0 (given x1 = 1), which is 12 . If she observes x1 = 0, her expectation of the value
of F is the conditional probability that x2 = 1, which is also 12 . Thus, in either case, agent
1 will bid 0.5 for F in the ﬁrst round. Similarly, agent 2 will also always bid 0.5 in the
ﬁrst round. Hence, the ﬁrst round of trading ends with a clearing price of 0.5. From this,
agent 2 can infer that agent 1 bid 0.5, but this gives her no information about the value of
x1—it is still equally likely to be 0 or 1. Agent 1 also gains no information from the ﬁrst
round of trading, and hence neither agent changes her bid in the following rounds. Thus, the
market reaches equilibrium at this point. As predicted by Theorem 3, both agents have the
same conditional expectation (0.5) at equilibrium. However, the equilibrium price of the
security F does not reveal the value of f (x1, x2), even though the combination of agents’
information is enough to determine it precisely.
4.2. Characterizing computable aggregates
We now give a necessary and sufﬁcient characterization of the class of functions f such
that, for any prior distribution on x, the equilibrium price of F will reveal the true value of
f . We show that this is exactly the class of weighted threshold functions:
Deﬁnition 4. A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a weighted threshold function iff there are
real constants w1, w2, . . . , wn such that
f (x) = 1 iff
n∑
i=1
wixi1.
Theorem 5. If f is a weighted threshold function, then, for any prior probability distribu-
tion P , the equilibrium price of F is equal to f (x).
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Proof. Let S∞i denote the possibility set of agent i at equilibrium. As before, we use p∞
to denote the ﬁnal trading price at this point. Note that, by Theorem 3, p∞ is exactly agent
i’s conditional expectation of the value of f (x), given her ﬁnal possibility set S∞i .
First, observe that if p∞ is 0 or 1, then we must have f (x) = p∞, regardless of the
form of f . For instance, if p∞ = 1, this means that E(f (y)|y ∈ S∞) = 1. As f (·) can
only take the values 0 or 1, it follows that P(f (y) = 1|y ∈ S∞) = 1. The actual value
x is always in the ﬁnal possibility set S∞, and, furthermore, it must have non-zero prior
probability, because it actually occurred. Hence, it follows that f (x) = 1 in this case. An
identical argument shows that if p∞ = 0, f (x) = 0.
Hence, it is enough to show that, if f is a weighted threshold function, then p∞ is
either 0 or 1. We prove this by contradiction. Let f (·) be a weighted threshold function
corresponding to weights {wi}, and assume that 0 < p∞ < 1. By Theorem 3, we must have
P(f (y) = 1|y ∈ S∞) = p∞, (1)
∀i P (f (y) = 1|y ∈ S∞i ) = p∞. (2)
Recall that S∞i = {y ∈ S∞|yi = xi}. Thus, Eq. (2) can be written as
∀i P (f (y) = 1|y ∈ S∞, yi = xi) = p∞. (3)
Now deﬁne
J+i = P(yi = 1|y ∈ S∞, f (y) = 1),
J−i = P(yi = 1|y ∈ S∞, f (y) = 0),
J+ =
n∑
i=1
wiJ
+
i ,
J− =
n∑
i=1
wiJ
−
i .
Because by assumption p∞ = 0, 1, both J+i and J−i are well-deﬁned (for all i): Neither is
conditioned on a zero-probability event.
Claim. Eqs. (1) and (3) imply that J+i = J−i , for all i.
Proof. We consider the two cases xi = 1 and xi = 0 separately.
Case (i): xi = 1. We can assume that J−i and J+i are not both 0 (or else, the claim is
trivially true). In this case, we have
P(f (y) = 1|y ∈ S∞) · J+i
P (f (y) = 1|y ∈ S∞) · J+i + P(f (y) = 0|y ∈ S∞) · J−i
= P(f (y) = 1|yi = 1, y ∈ S∞) (Bayes’ law)
p∞J+i
p∞J+i + (1− p∞)J−i
= p∞ (by Eqs. (1) and (3)),
J+i = p∞J+i + (1− p∞)J−i ,
⇒ J+i = J−i (as p∞ = 1).
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Case (ii). xi = 0. When xi = 0, observe that the argument of Case (i) can be used to
prove that (1− J+i ) = (1− J−i ). It immediately follows that J+i = J−i as well. 
Hence, we must also have J+ = J−. But using linearity of expectation, we can also
write J+ as
J+ = E
([
n∑
i=1
wiyi
]∣∣∣∣ y ∈ S∞, f (y) = 1
)
,
and, because f (y) = 1 only when∑i wiyi1, this gives us J+1. Similarly,
J− = E
([
n∑
i=1
wiyi
]∣∣∣∣ y ∈ S∞, f (y) = 0
)
,
and thus J− < 1. This implies J− = J+, which leads to a contradiction. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the converse of Theorem 5 also holds.
Theorem 6. Suppose f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} cannot be expressed as a weighted threshold
function. Then there exists a prior distribution P for which the price of the security F does
not converge to the value of f (x).
Proof. We start from a geometric characterization of weighted threshold functions. Con-
sider the Boolean hypercube {0, 1}n as a set of points in n. It is well known that f is
expressible as a weighted threshold function iff there is a hyperplane in n that separates
all the points at which f has value 0 from all the points at which f has value 1.
Now, consider the sets
H+ = Conv(f−1(1))
and
H− = Conv(f−1(0)),
where Conv(S) denotes the convex hull of S in n.H+ andH− are convex sets in n, and
so, if they do not intersect, we can ﬁnd a separating hyperplane between them. This means
that, if f is not expressible as a weighted threshold function, H+ and H− must intersect.
In this case, we show how to construct a prior P for which f (x) is not computed by the
market.
Let x∗ ∈ n be a point in H+ ∩ H−. Because x∗ is in H+, there exists some points
z1, z2, . . . , zm and constants 1, 2, . . . , m, such that the following constraints are satisﬁed:
∀ k zk ∈ {0, 1}n and f (zk) = 1,
∀ k 0 < k1,
m∑
k=1
k = 1,
m∑
k=1
kz
k = x∗.
J. Feigenbaum et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 343 (2005) 114–132 125
Similarly, because x∗ ∈ H−, there are points y1, y2, . . . , yl and constants 1, 2, . . . , l ,
such that
∀ j yj ∈ {0, 1}n and f (yj ) = 0,
∀ j 0 < j 1,
l∑
j=1
j = 1,
l∑
j=1
jyj = x∗.
We now deﬁne our prior distribution P as follows:
P(zk)= k
2
for k = 1, 2, . . . , m,
P (yj )= j
2
for j = 1, 2, . . . , l,
and all other points are assigned probability 0. It is easy to see that this is a valid probability
distribution. Under this distribution P , ﬁrst observe that P(f (x) = 1) = 12 . Further, for
any i such that 0 < x∗i < 1, we have
P(f (x) = 1|xi = 1)= P(f (x) = 1 ∧ xi = 1)
P (xi = 1)
= x
∗
i /2
x∗i
= 1
2
and
P(f (x) = 1|xi = 0)= P(f (x) = 1 ∧ xi = 0)
P (xi = 0)
= (1− x
∗
i )/2
(1− x∗i )
= 1
2
.
For indices i such that x∗i is 0 or 1 exactly, i’s private information reveals no additional
information under prior P , and so here too we have P(f (x) = 1|xi = 0) = P(f (x) =
1|xi = 1) = 12 .
Hence, regardless of her private bit xi , each agent i will bid 0.5 for security F in the
ﬁrst round. The clearing price of 0.5 also reveals no additional information, and so this is
an equilibrium with price p∞ = 0.5 that does not reveal the value of f (x). 
The XOR function is one example of a function that cannot be expressed as weighted
threshold function; Example 3 illustrates Theorem 6 for this function.
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4.3. Convergence time bounds
We have shown that the class of Boolean functions computable in our model is the class
of weighted threshold functions. The next natural question to ask is: How many rounds of
trading are necessary before the equilibrium is reached? We analyze this problem using the
same simpliﬁed Shapley–Shubik model of market clearing in each round. We ﬁrst prove
that, in the worst case, at most n rounds are required.
The idea of the proof is to consider the sequence of common knowledge sets  =
S0, S1, . . ., and show that, until the market reaches equilibrium, each set has a strictly lower
dimension than the previous set.
Deﬁnition 7. For a set S ⊆ {0, 1}n, the dimension of set S is the dimension of the smallest
afﬁne subspace of n that contains all the points in S; we use the notation dim(S) to
denote it.
Lemma 1. If Sr = Sr−1, then dim(Sr) < dim(Sr−1).
Proof. Let k = dim(Sr−1). Consider the bids in round r . In our model, agent i will bid her
current expectation for the value of F ,
bri = E(f (y) = 1|y ∈ Sr−1, yi = xi).
Thus, depending on the value of xi , bri will take on one of two values h
(0)
i or h
(1)
i . Note that
h
(0)
i and h
(1)
i depend only on the set Sr−1, which is common knowledge before round r .
Setting di = h(1)i − h(0)i , we can write bri = h(0)i + dixi . It follows that the clearing price in
round r is given by
pr = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(h
(0)
i + dixi). (4)
All the agents already know all the h(0)i and di values, and they observe the price pr at the
end of the rth round. Thus, they effectively have a linear equation in x1, x2, . . . , xn that they
use to improve their knowledge by ruling out any possibility that would not have resulted
in price pr . In other words, after r rounds, the common knowledge set Sr is the intersection
of Sr−1 with the hyperplane deﬁned by Eq. (4).
It follows that Sr is contained in the intersection of this hyperplane with the k-dimension
linear space containing Sr−1. If Sr is not equal to Sr−1, this intersection deﬁnes a linear
subspace of dimension (k−1) that contains Sr , and hence Sr has dimension at most (k−1).
Theorem 8. Let f be a weighted threshold function, and letP be an arbitrary prior proba-
bility distribution. Then, after at most n rounds of trading, the price reaches its equilibrium
value p∞ = f (x).
Proof. Consider the sequence of common knowledge sets S0, S1, . . ., and let r be the
minimum index such that Sr = Sr−1. Then, the rth round of trading does not improve any
agent’s knowledge, and thus we must have S∞ = Sr−1 and p∞ = pr−1. Observing that
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dim(S0) = n, and applying Lemma 1 to the ﬁrst r − 1 rounds, we must have (r − 1)n.
Thus, the price reaches its equilibrium value within n rounds. 
Theorem 8 provides an upper bound of O(n) on the number of rounds required for
convergence. We now show that this bound is tight to within a factor of 2 by constructing
a threshold function with 2n inputs and a prior distribution for which it takes n rounds to
determine the value of f (x) in the worst case.
The functions we use are the carry-bit functions. The function Cn takes 2n inputs; for
convenience, we write the inputs as x1, x2 . . . , xn, y1, y2, . . . , yn or as a pair (x, y). The
function value is the value of the high-order carry bit when the binary numbers xnxn−1 . . . x1
and ynyn−1 . . . y1 are added together. In weighted threshold form, this can be written as
Cn(x, y) = 1 iff
n∑
i=1
xi + yi
2n+1−i
1.
For this proof, let us call the agents A1, A2, . . . , An, B1, B2, . . . , Bn, where Ai holds input
bit xi , and Bi holds input bit yi .
We ﬁrst illustrate our technique by proving that computing C2 requires two rounds in the
worst case. To do this, we construct a common prior P2 as follows:
• The pair (x1, y1) takes on the values (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) uniformly (i.e., with
probability 14 each).• We extend this to a distribution on (x1, x2, y1, y2) by specifying the conditional distribu-
tion of (x2, y2) given (x1, y1): If (x1, y1) = (1, 1), then (x2, y2) takes the values (0, 0),
(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) with probabilities 12 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 respectively. Otherwise, (x2, y2) takes
the values (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) with probabilities 16 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
2 respectively.
Now, suppose x1 turns out to be 1, and consider agent A1’s bid in the ﬁrst round. It is
given by
b1A1 = P(C2(x1, x2, y1, y2) = 1|x1 = 1)
= P(y1 = 1|x1 = 1) · P((x2, y2) = (0, 0)|x1 = 1, y1 = 1)
+P(y1 = 0|x1 = 1) · P((x2, y2) = (1, 1)|x1 = 1, y1 = 0)
= 12 · 12 + 12 · 12
= 12 .
On the other hand, if x1 turns out to be 0, agent A1’s bid would be given by
b1A1 = P(C2(x1, x2, y1, y2) = 1|x1 = 0)
= P((x2, y2) = (1, 1)|x1 = 0)
= 12 .
Thus, irrespective of her bit, A1 will bid 0.5 in the ﬁrst round. Note that the function and
distribution are symmetric between x and y, and so the same argument shows that B1 will
also bid 0.5 in the ﬁrst round. Thus, the price p1 announced at the end of the ﬁrst round
reveals no information about x1 or y1. The reason this occurs is that, under this distribution,
the second carry bit C2 is statistically independent of the ﬁrst carry bit (x1 ∧ y1); we will
use this trick again in the general construction.
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Now, suppose that (x2, y2) is either (0, 1) or (1, 0). Then, even if x2 and y2 are completely
revealed by the ﬁrst-round price, the value of C2(x1, x2, y1, y2) is not revealed: it will be 1
if x1 = y1 = 1 and 0 otherwise. Thus, we have shown that at least two rounds of trading
will be required to reveal the function value in this case.
We now extend this construction to show by induction that the function Cn takes n rounds
to reach an equilibrium in the worst case.
Theorem 9. There is a function Cn with 2n inputs and a prior distribution Pn such that, in
the worst case, the market takes n rounds to reveal the value of Cn(·).
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on n. The base case for n = 2 has already
been shown to be true. Starting from the distribution P2 described above, we construct the
distributions P3,P4, . . . ,Pn by inductively applying the following rule:
• Let x−n denote the vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1), and deﬁne y−n similarly.We extend the dis-
tributionPn−1 on (x−n, y−n) to a distributionPn on (x, y) by specifying the conditional
distribution of (xn, yn) given (x−n, y−n): if Cn−1(x−n, y−n) = 1, then (xn, yn) takes
the values (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) with probabilities 12 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 , respectively. Other-
wise, (xn, yn) takes the values (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) with probabilities 16 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
2 ,
respectively.
Claim. Under distribution Pn, for all i < n,
P(Cn(x, y) = 1|xi = 1) = P(Cn(x, y) = 1|xi = 0).
Proof. A similar calculation to that used for C2 above shows that the value of Cn(x, y) under
this distribution is statistically independent of Cn−1(x−n, y−n). For i < n, xi can affect the
value of Cn only through Cn−1. Also, by construction of Pn, given the value of Cn−1, the
distribution of Cn is independent of xi . It follows that Cn(x, y) is statistically independent
of xi as well. Of course, a similar result holds for yi by symmetry.
Thus, in the ﬁrst round, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, the bids of agents Ai and Bi do not
reveal anything about their private information. Thus, the ﬁrst-round price does not reveal
any information about the value of (x−n, y−n).
On the other hand, agents An and Bn do have different expectations of Cn(x) depending
on whether their input bit is a 0 or a 1; thus, the ﬁrst-round price does reveal whether neither,
one, or both of xn and yn are 1. Now, consider a situation in which (xn, yn) takes on the
value (1, 0) or (0, 1). We show that, in this case, after one round we are left with the residual
problem of computing the value of Cn−1(x−n, y−n) under the prior Pn−1.
Clearly, when xn + yn = 1, Cn(x, y) = Cn−1(x−n, y−n). Further, according to the
construction of Pn, the event (xn + yn = 1) has the same probability ( 13 ) for all values of
(x−n, y−n). Thus, conditioning on this fact does not alter the probability distribution over
(x−n, y−n); it must still be Pn−1.
Finally, the inductive assumption tells us that solving this residual problem will take at
least n− 1 more rounds in the worst case and hence that ﬁnding the value of Cn(x, y) takes
at least n rounds in the worst case. 
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5. Discussion
Our results have been derived in a simpliﬁed model of an information market. In this
section, we discuss the applicability of these results to more general trading models.
Assuming that agents bid truthfully, Theorem 5 holds in any model in which the price is a
known stochasticallymonotone aggregate of agents’ bids.While it seems reasonable that the
market price satisﬁes monotonicity properties, the exact form of the aggregate function may
not be known if the volume of each user’s trades is not observable, this depends on the details
of the market process. Theorems 6 and 9 hold more generally; they only require that an
agent’s strategy depends only on her conditional expectation of the security’s value. Perhaps
the most fragile result is Theorem 8, which relies on the linear form of the Shapley–Shubik
clearing price (in addition to the conditions for Theorem 5); however, it seems plausible that
a similar dimension-based bound will hold for other families of non-linear clearing prices.
Up to this point, we have described the model with the same number of agents as bits of
information. However, all the results hold even if there is competition in the form of a known
number of agents who know each bit of information. Indeed, modeling such competition
may help alleviate the strategic problems in our current model.
Another interesting approach to addressing the strategic issue is to consider alternative
markets that are at least myopically incentive compatible. One example is a market mech-
anism called a market scoring rule, suggested by Hanson [13]. These markets have the
property that a risk-neutral agent’s best myopic strategy is to truthfully bid her current ex-
pected value of the security. Additionally, the number of securities involved in each trade
is ﬁxed and publicly known. If the market structure is such that, for example, the current
scoring rule is posted publicly after each agent’s trade, then in equilibrium there is com-
mon knowledge of all agents’ expectation, and hence Theorem 5 holds. Theorem 6 also
applies in this case, and hence we have the same characterization for the set of computable
Boolean functions. This suggests that the problem of eliciting truthful responses may be
orthogonal to the problem of computing the desired aggregate, reminiscent of the revelation
principle [19].
In this paper, we have restricted our attention to one class of aggregation functions—
Boolean functions of Boolean inputs. The proofs of Theorems 6 and 9 also hold if we
consider Boolean functions of real inputs, where each agent’s private information is a real
number. Further, Theorem 5 also holds provided the market reaches equilibrium. With real
inputs and arbitrary prior distributions, however, it is not clear that the market will reach an
equilibrium in a ﬁnite number of steps.
6. Conclusion
6.1. Summary
We have framed the process of information aggregation in markets as a computation on
distributed information. We have developed a simpliﬁed model of an information market
that we believe captures many of the important aspects of real agent interaction in an
information market. Within this model, we prove several results characterizing precisely
130 J. Feigenbaum et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 343 (2005) 114–132
what the market can compute and how quickly. Speciﬁcally, we show that the market is
guaranteed to converge to the true rational expectations equilibrium if and only if the security
payoff function is a weighted threshold function. We prove that the process whereby agents
reveal their information over time and learn from the resulting announced prices takes at
most n rounds to converge to the correct full-information price in the worst case. We show
that this bound is tight within a factor of two.
6.2. Future work
Some interesting and important next steps include gaining a better understanding of the
following:
• The effect of price accuracy and precision: we have assumed that the clearing price
is known with unlimited precision; in practice, this will not be true. Further, we have
neglected inﬂuences on the market price other than from rational traders; the market
price may also be inﬂuenced by other factors such as misinformed or irrational traders.
It is interesting to ask what aggregates can be computed even in the presence of noisy
prices.
• Incremental updates: if the agents have computed the value of the function and a small
number of input bits are switched, can the new value of the function be computed
incrementally and quickly?
• Distributed computation: in our model, distributed information is aggregated through a
centralized market computation. In a sense, some of the computation itself is distributed
among the participating agents, but can the market computation also be distributed? For
example, canwe ﬁnd a good distributed-computational model of a decentralizedmarket?
• Agents’computation: we have not accounted for the complexity of the computations that
agents must do to accurately update their beliefs after each round.
• Strategic market models: for reasons of simplicity and tractability, we have directly
assumed that agents bid truthfully. A more satisfying approach would be to assume
only rationality and solve for the resulting game-theoretic solution strategy, either in our
current computational model or another model of an information market.
• The common-prior assumption: can we say anything about the market behavior when
agents’ priors are only approximately the same or when they differ greatly?
• Average-case analysis: our negative results (Theorems 6 and 9) examine worst-case
scenarios, and thus involve very speciﬁc prior probability distributions and initial in-
formation states. It is interesting to ask whether we would get very different results for
generic prior distributions or expected information states.
• Information market design: non-threshold functions can be implemented by layering
two or more threshold functions together. What is the minimum number of threshold
securities required to implement a given function? This is exactly the problem of mini-
mizing the size of a neural network, a well-studied problem known to be NP-hard [16].
What conﬁguration of securities can best approximate a given function? Are there ways
to deﬁne and conﬁgure securities to speed up convergence to equilibrium? What is the
relationship between machine learning (e.g., neural-network learning) and information-
market design?
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